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The "State" of Private Networks: The Emerging 
Legal Regime of Polycorporatism in Germany 
Gunther Teu bner* 
In the elections for the work council of Daimler Benz AG, a 
large corporate group in Germany, the powerful industrial 
union, IG-Metall, experienced problems with an internal 
opposition group. After a long fight between the majority and 
the minority, the union established an election list that 
excluded any candidate from the minority group. The minority 
group then formed a "rainbow coalition" that united union 
members and non-members. Politically, the coalition united the 
radical reformist, feminist, anti-discriminatory, and ecological 
movements and challenged the union's course of close union- 
management cooperation. The rainbow-coalition won the 
majority of the work council seats in the elections. However, 
because the union considered any candidacy on a competing 
election list damaging to  its interests, it proceeded to expel the 
rainbow coalition's leading members. 
This case is paradigmatic of some of the recent 
developments in the German law of private associations. Like a 
magnifymg glass, the case accentuates a number of crucial 
legal issues: (1) autonomy of labor unions and other 
intermediary associations against state and court interference; 
(2) constitutional rights for organizations, especially in the field 
of collective bargaining1; (3) right to access intermediary 
associations, from any sector of society and for every member of 
this sector; (4) judicial review of internal rule production within 
the intermediary association; (5) protection of individual rights 
of membership against the intermediary associations, 
particularly protection against expulsion; (6) minimal legal 
requirements for internal democracy in intermediary 
* Professor of law at European University Institute, Firenze, and London 
School of Economics. 
1. GRUNDGESER [Constitution] [GG] art. 9, pt. 111 & 19, pt. 111 (F.R.G.). 
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associations; and (7) public responsibility of private 
organizations (Gemeinwohl-verpflichtung). 
My main argument is that the courts decide these 
questions according to a theory of associations internal to the 
law. Over time, legal discourse develops an internal theory 
about the position of private associations in politics and society. 
In fact, how the law regulates the internal affairs of 
associations depends on major historical shifts in the meaning 
of the public-private distinction. The "public" status of "private" 
associations means different things in different historical 
periods. In post-war German history, three ideal-typical 
conf igura t ions  can  be d i s t ingu i shed :  p l u r a l i s m ,  
macrocorporatism, and polycorporatism. Presently, it appears 
that while older pluralist arrangements have been replaced by 
more recent neocorporatist arrangements, a new shift is taking 
place within neocorporatism. Macrocorporatist arrangements 
are being superseded by a new political arrangement between 
the state and numerous private associations--one which I call 
"polycorporatist." In particular, a relationship exists between 
the new polycorporatist political arrangement, the legal 
perception of a public status of private associations, and the 
legal rules governing their external status and internal 
structures. This relationship has repercussions for all seven 
legal issues that are emerging in the rainbow-coalition case. 
"Invoking civil society" is the suggestive title of an article 
by Charles Taylor in which he discusses the public status of 
intermediary  association^.^ The ideas Taylor develops in the 
broader framework of political theory may be helpful in 
revising traditional legal perceptions of private associations. 
Taylor argues that a web of autonomous associations, 
independent of the state, is the core institution of civil society. 
And yet, because two competing models of civil society exist, it 
is unclear what invoking civil society actually means. In the 
tradition of Montesquieu (what Taylor calls the "M-stream"), 
civil society means political society. However, while civil society 
in the M-stream develops within the political process, it is 
2.  Charles Taylor, Invoking Civil Society, in WORKING PAPERS AND 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CENTER FOR PSYCHOSOCIAL STUDIES 1-17 (G. Urban & B. Lee 
eds., 1990). 
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crucial that i t  maintain its autonomy against state institutions. 
Of particular importance is the autonomy of intermediary 
 association^.^ Intermediary associations are constitutionally 
diverse, distributing power among many independent sources. 
The tradition of Locke (what Taylor calls the "Lstream") 
works on different assumptions. In the L-stream, civil society is 
pre-political society, a self-organizing, extra-political reality. In 
civil society, the social defends its autonomy against the 
political. (Adam Smith and Karl Marx's works evince this 
conception.) Civil society is not limited to the economy, but 
extends especially to things "public," and more generally to 
"civilization." 
Hegel attempted a synthesis integrating both L-stream and 
M-stream traditions in the idea of the overarching State. 
However, in retrospect, this turned out to be a great historical 
error. Therefore, which interpretation of civil society, Taylor 
asks, is valid under (post)modern conditions? In this context, 
he discusses neocorporatist arrangements in Germany and 
Japan as well as critiques of them from the right and the left. 
The question also arises whether we are presently experiencing 
a new dominance of the Gstream or whether we can foresee a 
new balance between L-stream and M-stream traditions? 
From this perspective, the communitarianism versus 
individualism dichotomy seems to present misleading 
alternatives. I t  presupposes a simplified image of society as a 
hierarchical relationship between individuals and a n  
overarching "state," with intermediary organizations lying 
somewhere in between. In this conceptual framework, 
intermediary associations "mediate" vertically individual needs 
and collective goals. Consequently, their orientation oscillates 
between individualist and communitarian concerns. However, 
as suggestive as this image might be, i t  would result in 
misleading public policies and legal regulations. The "public 
status" of intermediary associations would take on a rather 
impoverished meaning. The image would characterize 
intermediary organizations as the main link between individual 
interests and the state's interests. And, as a result, the 
concomitant idea of intra-organizational democracy would 
likely end in simple requests for more citizen participation in 
3. See generally SEYMOUR M. LIPSET, POLITICAL I+Wt TIIE SOCIAL BASES OF 
PoLIT1cs (1960); ALEXIS DE 'I~CQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Phillips Bradley 
ed. & Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1945) (1972). 
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public affairs within the associations. 
Indeed, the contemporary discussion on intermediary 
associations has  usually taken place within these 
a s ~ u m ~ t i o n s . ~  However, if Taylor is correct in viewing modern 
civil society as a new combination of Estream and M-stream 
conceptions, then the hierarchical model is plainly inadequate. 
It cannot cope with the contemporary reality of a fragmented 
society. The differentiation of specialized discourses within 
society precludes a simple hierarchical model of rulers and 
ruled; for politics itself has become decentered. In fact, politics 
is no longer the central instance of society, but only one among 
many discourses. Different lines of thought about modern 
society converge on this important point. A general discourse 
on society is, more than ever before, confronted with a 
"dissociation of its rule  system^,"^ a multitude "of language- 
 game^,"^ and a plurality of "semiotic groups."' Sociologists 
characterize modernity as the "separation of spheresr8 the 
differentiation of the "subsystems of ~ociety,"~ the "operational 
closure of autopoie~is,"~~ and the plurality of "forms of 
discourse and negotiation."" In this view of modern society, 
the hierarchy of state versus individual is irreversibly replaced 
by the heterarchy of different spheres of society. 
In a society thus fragmented, intermediary associations 
play a different role. Their main activity is not to mediate 
"vertically" between rulers and ruled in a manner comparable 
to the estates of the ancient regime. Rather, their new role is to 
mediate '%orizontally" between the autonomous logics of 
different social discourses. Intermediary associations mediate 
4. LIPSET, supra note 3; THOMAS H. MARSHALL, CLASS, CITIZENSHIP, AND 
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT (1964); Johan P. Olsen, Integrated Organizational 
Participation in Government, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 492, 
492-516 (Paul C. Nystrom & William H. Starbuck eds., 1981). 
5. JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE DIFFBREND: PHRASES IN DISPUTE 12 
@Ianchester: Manchester University Press 1987). 
6. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 23-24 (Oxford: 
Blackwell 1989). 
7. BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 133 et seq. 
(Liverpool: Deborah Charles 1988). 
8. PHILIP SELZNICK, MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL WORY AND THE 
PROMISE OF COMMUNITY 4 et seq. (1992). 
9. TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SYSTEM OF MODERN SOCIETIES 10 (1971). 
10. NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOZIALE SYSTEME: GRUNDRID EINER ALLGEMEINEN 
THEORIE passim (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1984). 
11. JURGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZITAT UND GELTUNG 196 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 
1992). 
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politics with other specialized sectors of society. Therefore, they 
participate simultaneously in the world of politics and in their 
specialized fields within society. The result is that intermediary 
associations have multiple memberships in different worlds of 
meaning, with their internal grammar reflecting the often 
contradictory claims of different discourses. Thus, the legal 
rules governing their public status as well as those governing 
their internal democratic processes need to be reformulated in 
light of the contradictory claims of these different discourses, 
instead of merely in light of the claims of their members and 
politics at large.12 
But how do intermediary organizations reflect Taylor's 
suggestion of a new balance between the M-stream and L- 
stream models? To respond, we need to distinguish between the 
differentiation of society in general and the internal 
differentiation of politics in particular. This will enable us to 
see "civil society" as a construct that combines elements of the 
M-stream and L-stream models. Social differentiation in 
general creates, among other things, the hiatus between the 
political process and non-political spheres of society. In this 
perspective we recognize the Estream. Civil society appears as 
a multitude of non-political, self-regulating social discourses 
with their own codes and programs, the economy being just one 
of these discourses. Furthermore, intermediary associations 
have the capacities of formal organizations (like political 
parties and special interest groups) to participate in both 
politics and sectors of civil society. It is their organizational 
goal to mediate internally between the demands of civil society 
and the requirements of the political process. 
At the same time, the political process in particular is 
internally differentiated into diverse sub-discourses: party 
politics, governmental institutions (parliament, administration, 
courts), and the political public (media, associations). The 
"state" is no longer the formal organization of society as a 
whole, but merely a self-description of politics, personifying 
parts of the political process in the image of a collective 
actor.13 In this perspective we recognize the M-stream. Thus, 
12. Wolfgang Streeck & Philippe Schmitter, Community, Market, State-and 
Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governnee-to Social Order, in 
~ Z ~ V A T E  INTEREST GOVERNMENT: BEYOND MARKET AND STATE 22-29 (Wolfgang 
Streeck & Philippe Schmitter eds., 1985). 
13. N m  LUHMANN, Political Theory in the Welfare State, in POLITICAL 
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a multitude of intermediary associations reappears within the 
political discourse as "mirroring," "representing" and "mapping" 
civil society. Such associations represent the plurality of social 
discourses within the political discourse. Their capacity as 
intermediaries depends on their relative autonomy within 
politics. 
This dual perspective allows us to distinguish three ideal- 
typical configurations of the relationship between the modern 
state and interest groups: pluralism, macrocorporatism, and 
polycorporatism. These configurations should not be understood 
as different historical phases of social differentiation in 
general, but of the internal differentiation of politics in 
particular. In this development, they represent three ways of 
conceiving the "public" role of "private" associations. They are 
specific representations of civil society within the political 
process--cognitive means of reconstructing social reality within 
politics. 
If these theoretical arguments make sense, then practical 
policy and legal considerations of intermediate associations 
need to be reoriented. The law regulating the external status 
and the internal structure of intermediary associations should 
no longer be primarily concerned with the relation between 
associations and their individual members on the one side and 
between associations and the state on the other, as the 
cornunitarianism-individualism dichotomy suggests. Rather, 
the law should focus on the role intermediary associations play 
as mediators between different discourses in society and should 
view its main task as dealing with the capacity of the political 
discourse to perceive (adequately) the plurality of social 
discourses. 
In post-war Germany, reconstructing intermediate 
associations turned out to be a dBcult task. The effort had to 
steer clear of two opposite traditions. The main task was to 
dismantle the authoritarian state corporatism of the fascist 
period with its compulsory associations that comprehensively 
organized whole sectors of society under the tight control of a 
single political party.14 At the same time, it was not 
THEORY IN THE WELFARE STATE 21 et seq. (Berlin: de Gruyter 1990). 
14. GAETANO VARDARO, D I R ~  DEL LAVORO E CORPORATMSMI IN EUROPA: IERI 
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conceivable to return to a regime of liberal associationalism 
where associations with exclusively private status needed 
protection against state interference.15 In this situation, 
political pluralism was a convincing concept that allowed for a 
new perception of political life and provided private 
associations with a public role to play. Forcefully advocated by 
American political scientists,16 political pluralism gained 
strong influence in West Germany. Indeed, pluralism 
transformed the private status of associations into a new public 
status without impairing their autonomy against the state. The 
perception of the new role of private associations was to 
aggregate private interests from different sectors of society into 
political interests, to represent those interests in politics, to 
serve as centers of political opposition, and to produce a pool of 
alternative political elites.'' 
The new West German law also responded positively to the 
messages of political pluralism. Constitutional law as well as 
private law developed rules and principles that constituted a 
new public status for private associations. The Grundgesetz 
(GG), West Germany's new constitution, granted a mix of old 
and new guarantees to associations. Article 9 (GG) guaranteed 
freedom of association and freedom of collective bargaining. 
Article 19, part I11 (GG) gave constitutional rights to legal 
persons. And Article 21, part I1 (GG) granted constitutional 
guarantees for political parties but a t  the same time required a 
minimum amount of intra-party democracy. 
In the first post-war period, German courts and doctrine 
gave these guarantees an explicitly pluralist interpretation. As 
compared to the classical liberal negative freedom of 
association, the courts elaborated positive constitutional 
guarantees for a pluralist system of interest mediation.18 Such 
a system's essential components were seen as organized in an 
unlimited number of different, voluntary, competing, non- 
E OGGI (Milano: Franco Angeli 1988). 
15. WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT, Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der 
Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen, in 1 WERKE 56-233 (Stuttgart 1792). 
16. ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, Tm PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL 
PRESSURES (1908); LIPSET, supra note 3; SEYMOUR M. LIPSET ET AL., UNION 
DEMOCRACY: ~ T E R N A L  POL~TICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION 
(1956); DAVID B. TRUMAN, TIIE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: P O ~ I C A L  (1951). 
17. LIPSET ET AL., supra note 16, at 85 et seq. 
18. Alfred Rinken in RUDOLF WASSERMANN, ALTERNATIVROMMENTAR ZUM 
GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLK DEUTSCHLAND 797 et seq. (Neuwied: 
Luchterhand 1984). 
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hierarchical and autonomous groups. Apart from the general 
guarantees of the constitution, these groups had no special 
state license, state recognition or state support. They were self- 
organizing and not formed upon state initiative. There was no 
state control over the recruitment of leaders or over interest 
articulation. And they had no representational monopoly within 
the social sector they represented.lg 
The Biirgerliche Gesetzbuch (BGB), the German civil code, 
provided only minimal requirements through mandatory rules 
for an association's internal organization. In the pluralist 
period, the courts applied straightforwardly the classical 
principles of the law of private associations with only slight 
modifications. Of central importance was the legal mechanism 
of "exit control." The basic norm was contained in section 39 
BGB, which guaranteed the freedom to leave private 
associations at any time. Furthermore, the governing principles 
of the internal order of pluralist associations were contractual 
conceptions of internal relationships, permissiveness in the 
internal provisions of associations, and high internal autonomy 
for organizations t o  "exit control" through the membership 
market.20 The guiding idea was to maintain a free 
membership market in different spheres of society. 
Similarly, the relationship between intermediary 
associations and politics was supposed to  be governed by 
market-type mechanisms. Just as a multitude of free firms is a 
virtual guarantee of economic competition, a pluralism 
composed of free intermediary associations helps guarantee 
competition among private associations for influence in the 
political market. Legally, this competition is supported by the 
incorporation of such associations as collective actors. The 
fiction of the legal person provides intermediary associations 
with the capacity for collective action in the political market. 
Another guarantee of this competition is the right of a private 
organization to freely define its own goals. Finally, the rule 
system of normative conditions that regulates their recognition 
in  practice comes close to the principle of free formation of 
bodies corporate which is necessary for the free interplay of 
19. Philippe C. Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, in THE NEW 
CORPORATISM: &KXAL-POLF~ICAL STRUCTURES IN THE IBERIAN WORLD 85-131 V.B. 
Pike & T. Stritch eds., 1974). 
20. ALBERT 0 .  HISRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE 
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
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political associations on the political market.21 
After World War 11, the BGB still contained certain 
repressive tendencies stemming from the discrimination of the 
Kaiserreich of 1900 against political associations (such as 
political parties and labor unions). To discourage their 
activities, the BGB had subjected them to discriminatory rules. 
For example, i t  applied to political associations ill-suited 
regulations from the law of partnerships and imposed upon 
them tough liability rules. In reaction, political parties and 
labor unions had traditionally refused to incorporate in order to 
avoid administrative pressures and controls. Now, under the 
Grundgesetz, a series of court decisions as well as new 
legislation totally freed political associations from all 
government dis~rimination.~~ Against the explicit wording of 
the BGB, the courts privileged associations, particularly labor 
unions, by giving them a public status and full rights of legal 
persons without undergoing the normal procedures of 
incorporation. In this way, the courts converted the positive 
constitutional guarantees for intermediary organizations into 
new rules of private law. 
However, under the regime of political pluralism, the 
recognition of the public status of intermediary associations 
was limited, particularly in their relation to civil society. The 
courts refused to recognize an individual right of access 
(Aufnahmezwang) to private associations, even if they were 
intermediary organizations like labor unions, professional 
organizations and political parties. Instead, the courts 
permitted each organization to define the criteria of 
membership and to  accept o r  refuse new members according to 
its own discretion. A state-granted right of access, the courts 
argued, would violate constitutional guarantees of freedom of 
a s s ~ c i a t i o n ~ ~  and the freedom of political parties.24 According 
to the courts, freedom of association does not end as an  
21. See generally THOMAS VORMBAUM, DIE RECHTSF~IGKEIT DER VEREINE IM 
19. JAHRHUNDERT: EN BEITRAG ZUR ENTSTEHUNGSGESCHICHTE DES BGB (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot 1976). 
22. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 13, 5, 10-11, 
42, 210, 215; 43, 245, 257; 50, 325, 331 et seq. (F.R.G.); Parteiengesetz 24.7.1967, 
BGBl.1 (1537) (F.R.G.). 
23. See G R U N D C X S ~  [Constitution] [GG] art. 9 (F.R.G.). 
24. See GRUNDGE~ETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 21, pt. I, 5 2 (F.R.G.); 
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 101, 193 et seq. 
(F.R.G.) for political parties. 
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individual right with the founding of an association. Rather, 
the right continues as a collective right of "the legitimate 
organs of the association to decide in their own responsibility 
and without any state interference . . . the question [ofl who 
shall be accepted as a new member."25 Under this pluralist 
regime, the mediation between politics and social discourses 
remained a matter of private initiative and was not regulated 
by the political process. 
At the same time, the courts upheld a high degree of group 
autonomy against state and court interference with the 
associations' internal affairs.26 In this respect, the courts once 
again considered public status irrelevant. In those days, they 
explicitly refused to apply different rules to associations 
holding a monopoly or a special position of social power.27 The 
courts recognized an extended associational autonomy not only 
for private clubs but also for intermediate organizations. Thus, 
the courts interfered with disciplinary action only in very 
narrow circumstances. The normative basis of any such 
interference was section 826 BGB (violation of boni mores). The 
courts would only interfere with an association's internal 
affairs if it "act[ed] against the law or against boni mores or 
violat[edl blatantly equity."28 Against the growing opposition 
of legal doctrine, German courts refused to scrutinize cases of 
disciplinary action for many years. Even in cases involving the 
expulsion of members, they were not willing to test the truth of 
the associations' factual bases. In fact, the courts granted 
judicial review only to answer two narrow questions: Did the 
expulsion have a formal basis in the constitution? Were some 
minimal requirements of due process met?29 
This type of organizational law may be termed "neutral 
formal law," which ideally meets the conditions of privateness, 
conditionality, formality and general it^.^' State control is used 
in a very indirect sense-only to the extent that the law 
25. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 101, 193 et 
seq. (F.R.G.). 
26. This has occurred since Entscheidungen des Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen 
[RGZ] 49, 150 (F.R.G.). 
27. See Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 47, 381, 
384-85 (F.R.G.). 
28. See Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 13, 5, 
10-11; 21, 370; 29, 354; 36, 109; 75, 158, 159; 87, 337, 343 (F.R.G.). 
29. BGHZ 45, 314. 
30. See J ~ E N  HABERMAS, ZUR REKONSTRURI~ON DES H I ~ R I S C H E N  
MATERIALISMUS (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1976). 
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attunes the organizational structures to a coordination between 
political and social markets. The law in its social theory 
assumes contractual mechanisms that are self-regulating. 
These contractual mechanisms are supposed to coordinate, on 
the one hand, the organizations' adaptation to the political 
market where interest groups compete for influence over policy 
issues. And, on the other hand, they are to balance social 
interests via private definitions of purpose. This pluralist law is 
founded on private autonomy and purposive rationality. It 
acquires its rationality from the conceptual model of perfect 
market competition. To be sure, the pluralist law does take 
account of the public status of private organizations, but only 
insofar as it guarantees them access to the political market and 
grants them autonomy within the political process. All the rest, 
especially the scope of their mediation with different sectors of 
civil society and their internal adaptation to this mediation, is 
left to private self-organization. 
This two-fold contractual mechanism (toward politics and 
toward civil society) creates an "elective affinity" of private 
organization law with the ideal type of a pluralist social 
structure. If pluralism is defined as transferring the liberal 
market model from individual actors to groups and 
organizations, then associative organizations can be seen as 
competing in two markets. They act in the market for political 
influence vis-8vis governmental bodies and political parties on 
the one hand, and in the market of different sectors of civil 
society that are competing for political representation on the 
other. In summation, then, in this first, pluralist phase of West 
German law, the rules of private organizations generally 
tended to supply legal structures that reflected a social 
pluralism. 
IV. MACROCORPORATISM: INTEGRATING 
CAPITAL AND LABOR INTO THE STATE 
The discrepancies between a pure pluralism model and the 
ugly reality of an asymmetrical pluralism with its consequences 
for the law of associations do not concern us here. Instead, our 
focus is on the transformation from pluralist to neocorporatist - 
structures that occurred in West Germany mainly in the 1960s 
and 1970s. This transformation is relevant not only for political 
science but also for law and legal policy. Consequently, it is 
important to evaluate the doctrinal problems that social 
organizations have faced as a result of this transformation, and 
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the response of the legal regime surrounding intermediary 
organizations. 
There are a number of competing concepts in the 
neocorporatist developmental trend. For the analytical model 
chosen here, a particularly suitable one would seem to be 
Philippe Schmitter's conception which splits the relationship 
between pluralism and corporatism into a number of 
dichotomies along different dimensions. "Social corporatism" is 
defined as a 
system of interest representation whose essential components 
are organized in a limited number of individual compulsory 
associations, not competing with each other, with a 
hierarchical structure and demarcated from each other in 
fbnctional respects. They have governmental recognition or 
permission, if they are not indeed set up on governmental 
initiatives. In the areas they represent, they are explicitly 
allowed a monopoly of representation, in exchange for which 
they must observe particular conditions in selecting leading 
personnel and in articulating or supporting claims?' 
For our discussion concerning the law of private 
organizations, Schmitter's definition must be rethought in 
terms of the legal relationships between associations and 
sectors of civil society on the one hand, and between 
associations and the political system on the other. Processes of 
transition to neocorporatist interest representation can then, 
generalizing, be described as a loss of nzarket mechanisms in 
both of an organization's relevant environments. On the one 
hand this means that competition between associations in the 
market for political influence is replaced by a new symbiosis 
between government agencies and big interest organizations, 
mainly capital and labor, which in part move directly into 
decision-making positions. On the other hand, there are 
repercussions in the "membership market" of civil society. Both 
changes directly impact the internal organizational structures. 
Governmental institutionalization, which makes the  
organization relatively independent v i s -h i s  its members, 
along with the production of public benefits, which decreases 
the incentive to cause fundamental changes in the 
31. Schmitter, supra note 19, at 94-95; Streeck & Schmitter, supra note 12, at 
8 et seq. 
32. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLEC3IVE ACTION (1965). 
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relationships between members and organizations. Under 
neocorporatist conditions, internal structures are increasingly 
marked by the 'logic of administration." In response to 
neocorporatist developments, free associations tend to become 
professional, centralized, functionally differentiated and 
"administratively rational" organizations. The neocorporatist 
paradigm has also produced a number of other concerns. 
A. Shifts in the Political Market 
Political pluralism had been characterized by a multiplicity 
of highly specialized interest organizations competing with each 
other. The aggregation of interests emerged, as it were, exter- 
nal to the single association because of competition in the polit- 
ical market for influence. However, under neocorporatist condi- 
tions, only a few umbrella associations with claims to wide- 
ranging representation and an institutionalized monopoly of 
representation arose. As a result, the aggregation of interests 
had to be accomplished internally-that is, within the large 
associations. The problem then became whether neocorporatist 
equivalents for competition between associations could be 
found. 
B. Shijh in Civil Society 
In pluralistic associational systems, the individual associa- 
tions had still been largely dependent on the membership mar- 
kets in different sectors of civil society. Entry and exit had 
been the main response mechanisms through which organiza- 
tional control operated. Under neocorporatist conditions, the 
relative weight of those mechanisms diminished as the associa- 
tions gradually became part of the government structure. Be- 
cause the members' motives and an organization's goals became 
increasingly independent of each other, the subtle mechanisms 
of consensus and control based on the principles of free entrg 
and free exit were partly deprived of their force. Intermediary 
associations gained a new independence in relation to their 
membership that made their responsiveness t o  civil society 
questionable. Thus, the issue became whether neocorporatist 
substitutes for pluralist organizational controls were available 
which would strengthen the associations' intermediary position 
between politics and civil society. 
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C. Changing Legitimation Problems 
The transition from pluralistic to neocorporatist forms was 
motivated essentially because the legitimation of politics versus 
civil society had become problematic. The new symbiosis of big 
interest organizations and governmental agencies unburdened 
the latter because they could now count on support from the 
organizations and on the internal enforcement of decisions in 
the organizations. However, the outcome was merely a shift in 
the legitimation gap. Similar legitimation problems now 
emerged between associations with public status and civil soci- 
ety as a conflict between the membership and the leadership of 
the various organizations. This presented a new challenge: the 
legitimation effects of the membership market and those of the 
influence market now had to be secured within the organiza- 
tion rather than from without. 
D. Increase in Need for Integration 
The mediation between social demands and government 
policy in the pluralism paradigm had brought about a pressure 
politics model. Private organizations had been linked with 
political decision-making bodies through channels of influence. 
Moreover, because of their relative autonomy, these organiza- 
tions could afford to pursue their social interests rather ruth- 
lessly. Mediations with other social interests and with govern- 
mental viewpoints had been left up to the governmental deci- 
sion-making bodies. This necessarily changed as neocorporatist 
organizations became involved directly in political decisions. 
They now had to act responsibly-that is, to bring about a two- 
fold integration by balancing organization policy with both gov- 
ernmental policies and social interests. 
A parallel development could be seen in all four concerns 
just discussed: a shift from external coordination between the 
political and the social markets to internal political processes 
within the intermediary organizations. Not surprisingly, legal 
policy focused particularly on the formation of political inter- 
ests within neocorporatist organizations, though often with 
confusing references to "organizational democracy" (understood 
as membership participation). 
In the German legal policy debate over corporatist legal 
regimes, the following public law concepts have been proposed 
for these formerly private law areas: (1) the actions of parties 
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to collective bargaining should be tied to imperative guidelines 
laid down by the government, (2) the legal principles of the 
beliehenen Unternehmer (private enterprises with public tasks 
to which rules of public law are applied selectively) should be 
extended far beyond their original range of application, (3) the 
actions of associations should be brought under government 
supervision, (4) checks on the legality of such actions should be 
made through the courts, (5) parliamentary controls and super- 
vision of associations through the courts of auditors should be 
introduced, and (6) associations should be brought under judi- 
cial or parliamentary control by legally binding them to a "pub- 
lic good" clause or some other general clause. The result of 
these proposals would be to convert private organizations into 
public-law corporate bodies.33 
The 1980s drastically altered the character of West Ger- 
many's macrocorporatism. The world-wide revitalization of neo- 
liberal policies has also deeply affected the German regime of 
trilateralism. Although it is true that German neo-corporatist 
regimes have not been destroyed by the wave of international- 
ization, deregulation and de-unionization, the quality of the 
corporatist regime in Germany has undergone substantial 
change.34 Political scientists have observed tendencies toward 
the decentralization and pluralization of the centralized trilat- 
eral corporatist arrangement between state, labor unions, and 
industrial associations. As Mayntz has observed, "At least in 
some areas the stable bilateral or trilateral relations of neo- 
corporatism seem to be substituted. . . by large interorganiza- 
tional networks."35 
While the central importance of the German "iron triangle" 
has considerably decreased, specialized political arenas increas- 
ingly have adopted corporatist  arrangement^.^^ In Germany, 
33. See Gunther Teubner, Neo-korporatistische Stmtegien rechtlicher 
figanisatwnssteuerung: Staatliche Strukturvorgaben fir gesellschaftliche 
Vemrbeitung politischer Konflikie, 10 ZEITSCHFUIT FUR PARLAMENTSFRAGEN 469-502 
(1979). 
34. Wolfgang Streeck, Status and Contract: Basic Categories of a Socwlogical 
Theory of Industrial Relations, in REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS IN EUROPE 105, 
135-45 @. Sugarman & G. Teubner eds., Baden-Baden: Nomos 1990). 
35. Renate Mayntz, Znteressenverbdinde und Gemeinwohl: Die Verbandestudie der 
Bertelsmann Stifhng, in VERBiiNDE ZWISCHEN ~ L I E D E R I N T E R E S S E N  UND 
GEMEINWOHL 32 (Renate Mayntz ed., Giitersloh: B e r t e l s m a ~  StiRung 1992). 
36. Marian D6hler & Philip Manow-Borgwardt, Korporatisierung als 
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there are now several policy arenas in which corporatist ar- 
rangements have been firmly established. This is especially 
true for technical ~tandardization,~' environmental policies,3' 
vocational training:' the health care and social poli- 
cys41 
Kenis and Schneider attempt to give a broader interpreta- 
tion to these de~elopments .~~ They argue that the tendencies 
toward a new "polycorporatism" are fostered by the following 
underlying long-term trends which became highly visible in the 
1980s: (1) the strengthening of non-state formal organizations 
in different sectors of society,43 (2) the increasing 
sectoralization and functional differentiation resulting in "over- 
crowded" policy maI~ing,4~ (3) the increased scope of state poli- 
gesundheitspolitische Strategie,  i n  MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FOR 
GESELLSCHAFTS~RSCHUNG (Kirln: Discussion Paper 9119 1991); Helena Flam, Corpo- 
rate Actors: Definition, Genesis, and Interaction, in MAX-PLANcK-INSTITUT FUR 
GE~ELLSCHAFTS~R~CHUNG (K6h Discussion Paper 90111 1990). 
37. See Josef Falke, Normungspolitik der Europdischen Gemeiwhaften zum 
Schutz von Verbrnuchern und Arbeitnehmern, in 3 JAHRBUCH ZUR STAATS UND 
VERWALTUNGSWISSENSCWFT 217-46 (1987); ~ N E R  WOLF, DER AND DER TECHNIK: 
GESCHICIFPE, STRUKWRELEMENTE UND FUNK!MON DER VERRECHTLICHUNG 
RECHTLICHER RISIKEN AM BEISPIEL DES ~MMISSIONSSC~S (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag 1986). 
38. See Helmut Voelzkow, et al., 'Regierung durch Verbdndd-am Besipiel der 
umweltbezogenen Technikstewrung, 28 POmI.%%E VIERTEUAHRESSCHRIFT 80-100 
(1987). 
39. See Josef Hilbert et al., Selbstordnung der Berufsbildung: Eine FaUstudie 
ttber die Evolution, Organisation und Funktion 'Privater Regierungen', in 
ARBEITSBERICHTE UND FORSCHUNGSMATERIALIEN 18 (Forschungsschwerpunkt ZukunR 
der Arbeit an der Universitiit Bielefeld ed., 1986); Wolfgang Streeck, 
Interessenuerbtinde als Hindernis und Vollzugstr@er 6ffentlicher Politik, in 
INST~ONELIB BEDINGUNGEN DER ARBEIT~ARKT- UND BESCH~~FTIGUNGSPOLITIR 
179-98 (F. Scharpf & M. Brockmann eds., F'rankfurt: Campus 1983). 
40. See MARIAN DOHLER, G E S U N D H E ~ ~  NACH DER VENDE": POLICY 
NETZWERKE UND ORDNUNGSPOLITISCHER Sl'RATEGIEWECHSEL IN GROSSBRITANNIEN, 
DEN USA UND DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHTAND (Berlin: edition Sigma 1990); 
G~RARD G ~ E N ,  NEOKORPORATISMUS UND GESUNDHEF~SWESEN (Baden-Baden: No- 
mos 1988). 
41. See Rolf G. Heinze & Thomas Olk, Sozialpolitische Stewrung: Von der 
Subsidiaritiit zum Korporatismus, in GESELLSCHAFT~STEUERUNG ZWISCHEN 
KORPORATISMUS ND SUBSIDIAR~TAT 162-94 a. Glagow ed., Bielefeld: Centaurus 
1984). 
42. See Patrick Kenis & Voker Schneider, Policy Networks and Pdicy Analysis: 
Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox, in POLICY NETWORKS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
AND TWEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 26,34-59 (Bernd Marin & Renate Mayntz eds., 
Frankfurt. Campus 1991). 
43. See Charles Perrow, A Society of Organizations, in KULTUR UND 
G E E L L s c m  3 et seq. (M. Haller et al. eds., Frankfurt: Campus 1988). 
44. See J. Richardson & A.G. Jordan Overcrowded Pdicy Making: Some British 
and European Reflections, 15 POLV SCI. 247, 247-68 (1983). 
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cy making in diverse policy arenas without the concomitant 
growth of necessary control ~apacities:~ (4) the decentraliza- 
tion and fragmentation of the state:6 and (5) the blurring of 
the boundaries between the public and the private resulting in 
trends of informal administrative actioa4' 
Kenis and Schneider argue that these trends are causing 
political overload and "governance under pressure." Increasing- 
ly unable to mobilize all necessary policy resources within its 
own realm, government consequently is becoming dependent 
upon the cooperation and joint resource mobilization of policy 
actors outside its hierarchical control. As a result, policy net- 
works between state and interest groups increase in impor- 
tance. These policy networks should be understood as webs of 
relatively stable and ongoing relationships that mobilize dis- 
persed resources so that collective action can be orchestrated 
toward the solution of a common policy problem.48 
In the move from centralized macrocorporatist arrange- 
ments to the more flexible, decentralized and pluralized net- 
works of polycorporatism, the internal differentiation of politics 
seems to undergo a new change. Two contradictory tendencies 
are working a t  the same time. First, the Entstaatlichung (pri- 
vatizing) of public policy: The state as a collective actor is re- 
ceding into the background. The experience of state failure in 
welfarist policies and the wave of deregulation have led to a 
partial retreat of administrative bureaucracies. Second, the 
Verstaatlichung (absorption into the state) of intermediary 
organizations: The role of intermediary organizations no longer 
consists solely of representing pluralist interests, but also of 
full-fledged participation in public policy, the implementation of 
state decisions, and even the autonomous self-administration of 
public affairs. 
The result is a new "state" of private networks. Against all 
observations to the contrary, the state as the self-description of 
politics does not shrink at  all; rather, it expands its scope and 
includes new and different collective actors. Instead of being 
the collective personification of a centralized governmental 
45. See Evelyn 2. Brodkin, Policy Politics: If We Can't Govern, Can We Man- 
age?, 102 POL. SCI. Q. 571, 571-87 (1987). 
46. See genemlly PATRICK ENIS, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION F AN INDUSTRY: 
A WORLD OF CHEMICAL FIBRE (Frankfurt: Campus 1991). 
47. See Jochen Hucke, Implementing Environmental Regulations in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 1 POL'Y STUD. J. 130, 130-40 (1982). 
48. See Kenis & Schneider, supra note 42, at 36. 
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hierarchy, the state is now being transformed into the self- 
description of a loose network of private and public actors. In 
such a network, governmental bureaucracies, political parties 
and autonomous social organizations form a loosely joined 
cooperative configuration which replaces the hierarchical unity 
of old state g~vernment.~' 
Within this network, a new political division of power be- 
tween governmental bureaucracies and private sector organiza- 
tions is emerging. Governmental bureaucracies relinquish part 
of their public competence while private associations give up a 
part of their private autonomy.50 Thus, "private" associations 
take over governmental activities which, in their view, were not 
functioning well.51 But this requires a new orientation of their 
activities. With this new public role for private associations, the 
new objective for the legal constitution of social organizations is 
to increase their responsiveness to general and public inter- 
e s t ~ . ~ ~  The new formula is "publicly responsible self-regulation 
in decentralized social systems."53 
Consequently, the "network state" can only work if govern- 
ment is strong, not weak. Government in this regime is con- 
cerned with facilitating organizational development and institu- 
tionalizing the public status of intermediary groups. If these 
associations are to work as private governments, they need to 
be supplied with additional power and authority that they 
could not mobilize solely on a voluntary basis. At the same 
time, government is not restricted merely to delegating deci- 
sion-making power to intermediary organizations. Rather, the 
new governmental role is to monitor constantly and to redesign 
the self-regulation of intermediaries. Thus, government retains 
considerable power of direct regulation, not only as a last resort 
but also as a wedible threat to the new private governments. I t  
49. See generally Fritz W .  Scharpf, Die Handlungsfahigkeit des Staates am 
En& des Zwanzigsten Jahrhudrts, 32 POLITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFP 621-34 
(1991). 
50. See Wolfgang Streeck, Vielfalt und Interdependenz: Probkme intennediiirer 
Organisationen in sich andenden Umwelten, 39 KiXNER ZEITSCHRIFT FOR 
SOZIOLWE UM) SOZIALPSICHOLOGIE 488 (1987). 
51. See Volker Ronge, Vom Verbandegesetz zur Sozialvertrdiglichkeit: Die 
offentliche und verbandliche Diskusion iiber den Gemeinwohlbezug von Verbanden 
in den 80er Jahren, in VERBWE ZWISCHEN bfImLIEDERmTERESSEN UND 
GEMEINWOHL 59 (R. Mayntz ed., Giitersloh: Bertelsmann StiRung 1992). 
52. See Mayntz, supra note 35, at 13; Streeck & Schmitter, supra note 12, at 
2 1. 
53. See Mayntz, supra note 35, at 22. 
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is only "by a combination of procedural, instead of substantive, 
regulations with a credible threat of direct intervention" that 
government can hold private governments a t  least partially 
accountable to the 
VI. CONSTITUTIONALIZING POLYCORPORATIST ASSOCIATIONS 
What are the consequences of polycorporatism for the law 
of intermediary associations? And what role are the courts 
playing in the new polycorporatist arrangements? Let us return 
to the rainbow-coalition, our paradigmatic case in which a 
union expelled some of its members because in the elections for 
work councils they had challenged their union with an alterna- 
tive list of candidates. In a series of decisions, the courts came 
up with a solution that totally reversed traditional principles of 
the law of private associations. The courts now tend to nullify 
such expulsions and to reinstate the political opponents to their 
former membership status. Our case illustrates how private 
law is reacting to the transition from pluralist interest media- 
tion, to neo-corporatist arrangements as well as to the recent 
tendencies toward polycorporatism. It also suggests how the 
courts may deal in the future with some of the legal issues 
delineated at the beginning of this paper.55 
A. Autonomy of Polycorporatist Associations 
Against Court Interference 
In  the area of the autonomy of polycorporatist associations 
in relation to the courts, a dramatic change of the courts' poli- 
cies has occurred. In 1983, a landmark decision finally aban- 
doned the old tradition of associational autonomy.56 Since 
then, the courts have also scrutinized the factual basis of an 
association's disciplinary actions. The underlying motive for 
this change was the new public status of private associations, 
which has moved the review of private associations very close 
to  the judicial review of governmental administrative decisions. 
The result is the pervasive judicial control of the administra- 
tive decisions of intermediary associations, with some narrowly 
interpreted areas of secondary discretion. 
54. See Streeck & Schrnitter, supra note 12, at 26. 
55. See supra part I. 
56. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 87, 338 et 
seq (F.R.G.). 
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B. Constitutional Rights for Organizations 
(GG art. 9, pt. 111 & art. 19, pt. III (F.R.G.)) 
Here as well we find a dramatic reinterpretation of the 
negative effects of rights in terms of institutional guarantees 
with procedural consequences. In the work council election cas- 
es, the unions claimed that their internal decision-making 
processes were strongly protected by the constitutional guaran- 
tees of GG art. 9, pt. 111. If under law unions have the institu- 
tional entitlement to participate in work council elections, they 
argued, then the constitution protects their right to influence 
their members in the election procedure. Furthermore, the 
unions argued that this protection should also cover the right 
to put their members under the obligation not to appear a s  
candidates on competing election lists.57 
The courts, however, perceived the consequence of the 
neocorporatist incorporation of labor unions into the process of 
work council elections within enterprises. Accordingly, the 
courts extended the institutional protection of the integrity of 
the voting procedures. into the internal decision-making pro- 
cesses of the unions, insofar as the voting procedures are an 
integral part of the election process. Thus, they applied section 
20 Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, which prohibits "influenc[ing] 
the work council elections by threatening or inducing damag- 
es," even in relation to internal affairs of unions. As is clear, 
the courts in this situation were confronted with a conflict 
between the external principles of a free work council election 
and the internal autonomy of labor unions. In the end, they 
gave priority to the integrity of the election procedure, thereby 
building on the neocorporatist integration of unions that can no 
longer legitimately claim the autonomy of purely private associ- 
ations. 
C. Individual Rights of Membership, Judicial Review of 
Internal Rule-Making, and Protections Against Expulsion 
Under Polycorporatist Regime 
To what extent are individual rights of membership rein- 
terpreted under a polycorporatist regime? Should the courts 
57. UIrike Wendeling-Schrtider, AktueUe Probleme der Rechtsprechung zum 
Gewerkschaftsausschlu~, 19 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR GESELLSCHAFTS-UND 
UNTERNEHMENSRECHT 110-11 (1990). 
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protect sectors of civil society by granting individual rights 
against associations, including the right of access? And should 
there be judicial control over the internal rule-making of associ- 
ations and protection of individuals against expulsion? In prin- 
ciple, if a social organization exclusively represents entire sec- 
tors of social life, its public status requires it to guarantee 
access to interested individuals and to protect their member- 
ship status. 
Here we find the third decisive turn of the German judicia- 
ry.58 Once again, it was the historical shift in the external re- 
lations of private associations that motivated the courts to 
abandon the old principle of associational freedom in the selec- 
tion of its members. Neocorporatist associations have a mo- 
nopoly of representation in their respective social spheres. As a 
consequence of such monopoly power, the courts have curtailed 
the freedom of neocorporatist associations to deny individuals 
membership. However, the courts also have extended their 
control beyond associations with a representative monopoly. 
Now it is sufficient if they exert considerable "social power." In 
fact, if an association performs a public role, then the courts 
will grant individuals the right to access that association. 
Should it desire to refuse someone membership, the association 
must demonstrate "substantive reasons," which the courts 
reserve the right t o  review.59 
By implication, judicial supervision of access to associa- 
tions has been extended to include judicial review of the 
associations' internal rule-making procedures. The internal 
law-making power of private associations has long been the 
center of associational autonomy and had been respected by the 
courts. However, the German Federal Court no longer recogniz- 
es this autonomy for associations with a public status. Rather, 
judicial control is presently necessary for those "associations 
that exert considerable power in the economic or social sec- 
tor.*' Theoretically, the courts employ the "good faith" stan- 
dard to review an association's laws and procedures. Practical- 
ly, however, they weigh the interests of an association against 
the interests of its members.61 
58. See Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 63, 282; 
93, 151; 102, 265 (F.R.G.). 
59. Peter Bartodiziej, Anspruck auf Mitgliedschaft in Vereinen und Verbtinden, 
20 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR GESELLSCHAF~S--UND TERNEHMENSRECIFP 517-546 (1991). 
60. BGH NJW 1989, 1724. 
61. See HermannJosef Bunte, Richterliche ZnhaltskontroUe von Verbandsmrmen: 
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Strong judicial protection of members i n  their  
micropolitical activities within the union against expulsion and 
other disciplinary matters follows directly from this new per- 
ception of private associations. This protection is especially 
relevant in our paradigmatic case of work council elections.62 
The courts themselves draw the fine line between legitimate 
internal opposition and illegitimate activities which damage 
the association. Currently, participation in a competing election 
list is still covered by the right to internal opposition. The lim- 
its of legitimate dissent are reached when the opposition works 
toward a "total c~nfrontation."~~ 
D. Internal Democracy in Quasi-Public Private Associations: 
Minimal Requirements of Law 
In the work council cases, the courts went beyond the mere 
protection of individual membership positions by demanding a 
minimal amount of associational democracy from associations 
with the institutionalized right to participate in work council 
elections. They made the union's right to request election disci- 
pline contingent upon the nature of the internal procedures 
governing the preselection of union  candidate^.^^ Moreover, 
the courts did not require internal elections in the unions. 
Rather, we encounter a judicial reinterpretation of direct and 
participatory democracy in terms of internal pluralism and the 
public responsibility of private organizations. 
VII. GEMEINWOHL~ERPFLICHTUNG: 
PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY OF PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS 
These developments in judge-made law can be understood 
as tendencies toward a new legal regime of polycorporatism. 
The key theoretical development is a new concept of 
Besprechung &r Entscheidung BGH ZIP 1989, 14, 20 ZEFPSCHRIFT FOR 
GESELLSCHAFTS-UND UNTERNEHMENSRECHT 316, 317-25 (1991); BARBARA 
GRUNEWALD, DER AUSSCHLUSS AUS GESELLSCHAFT UND VEREIN 126 et seq. ( K o h  
Heymanns 1987). 
62. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 45, 314 et 
seq.; 71, 126 et seq.; 87, 337 et seq.; 102, 265 (F.R.G.). 
63. Cf Wendeling-Schroder, supra note 57, at 107, 107-130; WOLFGANG 
ZOLLNER, ZUR FRAGE DES GEWERKSCHAFTSAUSSCHLUSSES WEGEN 
GEWERRsCHAFTSSCHiiDIGENDER KANDIDATuR BE1 BETRIEBSRATSWAHLEN: m 
RECKPSGUTACHTEN (Stuttgart: Daiber 1983). 
64. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 45, 314 et 
seq.; 71, 126 et seq.; 87, 337 et seq.; 102, 265 (F.R.G.). 
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associational autonomy. Classical private autonomy shielded 
associations' activities against judicial intervention and dowed 
judicial review only in the narrow case of an open abuse of 
power. Under conditions of polycorporatism, this private auton- 
omy tends to be replaced by a new social autonomy of quasi- 
public associations. 
Taking autonomy seriously means to rely on self-determina- 
tion and at the same time on inevitable extenalization (out- 
side control), not understood as hetero-determination but as a 
potential outside support in situations of impossible self-help. 
It would be similar to therapeutical help and to supportive 
structures outside of the law.65 
The private law of polycorporatism is looking to a new 
balance of social autonomy of intermediary associations on the 
one side, and their structural coupling to  the legal system on 
the other. Under a polycorporatist regime, intermediary associ- 
ations take over important public decision-making powers. And 
while the courts do not interfere with these powers, they do 
place limits on the intermediaries' control of membership condi- 
tions and on their rule-making power. Here, one might find 
elements of what Taylor calls the new balance between the L 
stream and M-stream conceptions. If the idea of social autono- 
my is applied not only to the economic sector, but also to a 
multiplicity of social disco~rses,6~ it may well become a model 
for new ways in which law opens up to the dynamics of civil 
society. 
65. Rudolf Wietholter, Zum Fortbildungsrecht der (richterlichen) Rechts- 
fortbildung.. Fragen eines lesenden Recht-Fertigungslehrers, in 3 KRITISCHE 
VIERTELJAHRE~ZE~TSCH~ ~ i i R  G E S ~ G E B U N G  UND RECHTSWISSENSC~ 1,27-28 
(1988). 
66. Id. 
